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1. Whom to admit when the concern of the receiving country is the wellbeing of 
those who stay behind in the sending country 
 
 
1.1  Let labor be the only production input in the home country H. Let the output, hence the 
gross earnings, of any worker in H be an increasing function both of the worker’s own skill 
level and of the economy-wide average skill level. Let there be two types of worker - low 
ability, unskilled workers, and high ability, skilled workers. Let the fractions of the two types 
be 12  each. Let the level of skill of the unskilled be θ , and let the level of skill of the skilled 
be *θ , where *θ θ> . The low ability workers cannot acquire a skill level that is higher than 
θ . The high ability workers can optimally choose how much human capital to acquire. Let θ  
be normalized at zero. Then, to begin with, the average skill level in H is 
 
 
* *1 0 1
2 2
θ θ
⋅
⋅ + ⋅ =  (1) 
 
Let the earnings of a worker whose skill level is 0θ ≥  be higher in the developed 
country of destination, D, than in H. Let θ  neither depreciate nor appreciate upon migration, 
and let the employers in D discern θ  accurately and instantly upon a migrant’s arrival. Hence, 
any H country worker will be better off if he migrates to D. 
 
1.2  If a fraction of the unskilled leave, what will the effect be on those who stay behind? 
Suppose that 14  of the unskilled leave. Then, the new average skill level at H will be 
 
 
*
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0 1 θ θ ⋅⋅ + ⋅ =  (2) 
 
Since * *4 17 2θ θ> , all those who stay behind gain by virtue of the new average skill level at H 
being higher. 
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1.3 Suppose, alternatively, that 14  of the skilled workers leave. Clearly, the consequent 
average skill level at H will be 
 
 
*
*
3
4 3
77
4
1 0 θ θ ⋅⋅ + =  (3) 
Since * *3 17 2θ θ<  (recalling (1)), the new average skill level is lower and hence, every H 
country worker who stays behind will therefore be worse off. 
 
In a static framework, a D country that is concerned about the wellbeing of those who 
stay behind at H, if faced with a choice of either admitting unskilled workers from H or 
skilled workers from H, will thus want to admit unskilled workers from H. 
 
1.4  But suppose that, in line with the “New Economics of the Brain Drain” (Stark, 2005), we 
have a dynamic setting: the prospect of migrating to D induces the skilled (high ability) 
workers to acquire more human capital, **θ , such that ** *43θ θ ε= + , where ε  is any positive 
number, however small. Then, not only will the unskilled who stay behind gain from the 
migration of the skilled, they will gain more than they would have gained if 14  of the unskilled 
migrated. If ** *43θ θ ε= + , then the new average level of human capital at H will be 
 
 
( )* * *3 44 3 34 4
7 7 77
4
0 1 θ ε θ ε θ ⋅⋅ + + = + >  (4) 
 
Hence, if ** *43θ θ> , the unskilled who stay behind will indeed gain more. 
 
1.5 The lesson to be drawn from this back-of-the-envelope exercise is that the migration 
policy of a benevolent D cannot be oblivious to the responses to the policy, to the incentives 
that the policy triggers, and to the impact of those responses on the wellbeing of those who 
stand to be affected by the policies indirectly. 
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2. How and why the migration policy of the receiving country will be “para-
doxically” shaped when there are incentives to form human capital 
 
 
2.1  Let there be n  workers in H: 2n  low ability workers with skill level 2θ = , and 2n  high 
ability workers with skill level * 6θ = , such that skill level *θ  was formed when the 
probability of migration to D was 14 . The skill level θ  was formed independently of the 
probability of migration and cannot be affected by (changes in) that probability. The D 
country is not able to decipher the skill levels of individual migrant workers; it can only 
decide on the numbers that it admits. At the outset, the average skill level at H, θ , is 4, as is 
the average skill level of the migrant workers, assuming that the shares of the workers of the 
two skill types in a migration flow are the same as their shares in the population of H. 
 
2.2  Let D seek to have the average skill level of the migrants at a level higher than 4, indeed, 
higher than 5 which is the current average level of human capital at D. If D could select, it 
would admit only those whose skill level is 6, thereby achieving its objective. But it cannot. 
So let us consider the repercussions of D increasing the probability of migration from 14  to, 
say, 12  such that, as a consequence, while those whose skill level is θ  do not acquire any 
additional human capital, the high ability workers now acquire 6 2 ε+ +  units of human 
capital. The new average level of human capital of the migrants (like that of those who stay 
behind at H), will be 
 
 2
2 (6 2 ) 5 5
2
εε ⋅+ + + = + >  (5) 
 
Thus, D benefits, the unskilled who stay behind benefit (since 25 4ε+ > ), and the migrating 
skilled benefit (assuming that they expose their 6 2 ε+ +  units of human capital to a superior 
rewarding production environment at D). If the skilled who stay behind are also better off, 
then everyone is better off. 
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Note that raising the probability of migration from 14  to 12  entails a doubling of the 
numbers of both the skilled migrants and of the unskilled migrants. 
 
2.3 A lesson to be drawn from this back-of-the-envelope exercise is that the dynamic 
consequences of a migration policy could invite a policy that appears somewhat 
“paradoxical:” to overcome the adverse repercussions of the presence of unskilled workers in 
the incoming migration flow, more unskilled workers are admitted. 
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